This paper examines the association between the composition of the board of directors and earnings management activity for a period spanning the publication of the Cadbury Report (1992). Central to both the Cadbury Committee's initial remit and its subsequent recommendations is the view that director integrity and board effectiveness play a key role in ensuring the quality and reliability of published financial statements. We evaluate the impact of the Cadbury Report by testing for evidence of income-increasing abnormal accruals when unmanaged earnings undershoot target earnings and whether outside directors help constrain such activity.
INTRODUCTION
Boards of directors are legally charged with monitoring management on behalf of shareholders. Traditionally, however, boards of large U.K. companies were considered relatively passive entities, often dominated by the very managers whom they were supposed to monitor. This raised concerns in some quarters about a possible lack of managerial accountability. The Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (1992) (hereinafter, Cadbury Report) focused attention on the board's monitoring responsibilities and highlighted the special contribution that non-executive directors (NEDs) can make to this process. Subsequent efforts by U.K. listed firms to comply with the recommendations contained in the Cadbury Report have increased both the profile of, and the demand for, NEDs (Peasnell et al., 1998; Cadbury Compliance Report, 1995) . However, the benefits, if any, associated with the increasing use of NEDs have yet to be documented. This paper empirically tests whether the increased emphasis on the board's monitoring function is associated with improved managerial accountability, as reflected by a reduction in the level of accrual management activity.
The Cadbury Committee was established in May 1991 by the Financial
Reporting Council, the London Stock Exchange and the accountancy profession to review the aspects of corporate governance specifically related to financial reporting and accountability. A primary stimulus underlying its formation was the declining confidence in U.K. financial reporting, resulting (in part) from a series of unexpected business failures and high profile financial scandals that occurred during the late 1980s and early 1990s. The widespread manipulation of accounting numbers was believed by many to lie at the heart of the problem (e.g., Smith, 1992; Griffiths, 1986) .
In response, the Committee issued a voluntary Code of Best Practice aimed at promoting higher standards of corporate behaviour. A central theme in the Cadbury Report is the link between internal governance procedures and the financial reporting process. Pivotal to the Code of Best Practice is the role of the board, and in particular its NED component, in helping to ensure the quality and integrity of accounting information. 1 Despite substantial changes in the composition and organisation of U.K.
boards resulting from efforts to comply with the Code of Best Practice, many in the business community are dissatisfied with the increased emphasis on the board's monitoring duties and the associated "corporate watchdog" view of NEDs. In particular, many feel that the costs of complying with the Cadbury proposals outweigh the benefits and that the quest for increased accountability threatens corporate enterprise. As such, the Cadbury Report engenders strong reactions both for and against. These alternative viewpoints are reflected in the governance statements made by GrandMet plc and Hanson plc in their 1992 annual reports. Thus, while GrandMet (pp.7) state that they "… fully support the spirit and letter of the Cadbury recommendations.", Hanson (pp.4) assert that "… much has been said recently about corporate governance, but most of the advise has been long on accountability and short on encouraging efficiency and expertise." Yet despite these alternative perspectives, little empirical evidence exists quantifying the impact of the Cadbury Report, particularly in terms of its effect on the quality of U.K. financial reporting.
This paper evaluates the effect of the Cadbury Report by examining the links between board composition and earnings management activity in the period spanning its publication. We proxy for earnings management using abnormal working capital accruals. Board composition is defined as the ratio of NEDs to total board size. A comparison of earnings management activity in the pre-and post-Cadbury periods represents an appropriate means of evaluating the impact of the Cadbury Report given that concern over the use of creative accounting practices was a key issue in the Committee's remit. Our results provide no evidence of an association between income-increasing abnormal accruals and the proportion of NEDs in the pre-Cadbury period (1990) (1991) . Conversely, results for the post-Cadbury period (1994) (1995) indicate that when the proportion of NEDs is high, managers are less likely to make income-increasing accruals to avoid reporting earnings losses or earnings declines.
Our evidence therefore supports the view that appropriately structured boards are discharging their financial reporting duties more effectively post-Cadbury.
Although our results are consistent with improved board monitoring in the post-Cadbury period, our tests do not directly demonstrate that the structural break in the association between abnormal accruals and board composition was caused by the Cadbury Report's recommendations and the associated pressure for increased managerial accountability. Consequently, we also examine two competing explanations for our findings. First, we test whether a change in the earnings management instrument surrounding the introduction of FRS3: Reporting Financial Performance (ASB, 1992) is driving our results (e.g., if firms used extraordinary items to manage reported results before 1993 and discretionary accruals afterwards).
Secondly, we test whether temporal variation in the stimulus for earnings management can explain our findings. Results suggest that neither explanation can account for the observed structural break. These tests provide some assurance that our findings are not being driven by factors unrelated to the Cadbury Report. We therefore conclude that the Cadbury Report and the associated debate on board monitoring has had a positive impact on the quality and integrity of U.K. financial reporting by improving the effectiveness with which boards, and NEDs in particular, monitor managers' accounting choices.
The paper contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, we present evidence that, given the appropriate conditions, NEDs can help constrain earnings management activity and hence increase the quality of financial reports.
These results generalise the findings reported by Dechow et al. (1996) and Beasley (1996) to a different institutional setting and to a more subtle form of earnings management.
2 In so doing, we also add to the growing body of evidence supporting the view that board effectiveness is a positive function of the proportion of outside members (e.g., Brickley et al., 1994; Byrd and Hickman, 1992; Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990; Weisbach, 1998) . Finally, we present evidence that the effectiveness with which U.K. boards discharge their financial reporting duties has improved since the publication of the Cadbury Report.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The following section discusses the role and evolution of the board of directors in the U.K., and develops the prediction of improved board monitoring in the post-Cadbury period. Section 3 presents details of our research design and sampling procedure, while section 4 reports evidence of a change in the relationship between earnings management and board composition over the period 1990-1995. Section 5 presents and tests two competing explanations for our findings. Conclusions appear in section 6.
MOTIVATION AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT

Boards and Monitoring
Boards of directors perform the dual roles of decision ratification and decision monitoring (Fama and Jensen 1983, pp.311) . To facilitate effective monitoring, boards include non-executive members who are independent of management. Proponents of the boards-as-monitors view believe that independent NEDs are central to the effective resolution of agency problems between managers and shareholders (e.g., Fama and Jensen, 1983, pp. 311) . Until recently, however, the boards of large U.K. companies were typically composed of senior managers selected from within the organisation.
For example, over 20% of companies in the Times 1000 had no NEDs in 1982 (Bank of England, 1983) . Further, while non-executives accounted for an average of 35% of total board membership by 1985, over 60% of firms admitted to appointing professional advisors or former executives as NEDs (Bank of England, 1985) . For these companies, affiliated NEDs comprised almost 50% of all non-executive board members. Only 20% of companies surveyed had a majority of non-executive board members. As a result, the arms-length relationship implied in the board's monitoring role was severely compromised. In the event that a firm does not fully comply, details of (and reasons for) the non-compliance must be disclosed, thereby making non-compliance a potentially costly action.
The recommendations contained in the Cadbury Report, together with the increased concern with corporate governance matters more generally, have resulted in a substantial re-organisation of U.K. boards. By 1996, the average proportion of NEDs on the boards of U.K. non-financial companies had risen to 45%, of which almost 66%
were independent of management (Peasnell et al. 1998) . Moreover, to ensure that the direction and control of the organisation is firmly in the hands of the board, most companies now have a formal schedule identifying matters reserved to the board for decision (Cadbury Compliance Statement 1995, pp.24) . As a result, many boards now operate in a different mode than they did a few short years ago and a view is emerging that U.K. boards have begun to evolve from managerial rubber-stamps into active and independent monitors of management. 3 However, opinion on the monitoring role of the board and the watchdog view of NEDs remains sharply divided. On the one hand, many shareholder groups and governance specialists view the monitoring role ascribed to NEDs in the Cadbury Report as one of its most significant contributions and believe that it has led to an improvement in the calibre and effectiveness of U.K. boards. 4 In contrast, others view the increased emphasis on NEDs for monitoring and control purposes as either irrelevant, excessively costly, or as a threat to board unity. 5 In addition, many critics maintain that NEDs perform little or no real monitoring role because they lack the necessary independence, time, expertise, and information to challenge management effectively (Gilson and Kraakman, 1991, pp.875; Patton and Baker, 1987, pp.11) . In the absence of a clear theoretical basis for distinguishing between these competing views, the impact of the Cadbury Report and the increased emphasis on monitoring via non-executive board members is an empirical issue on which this paper aims to provide some evidence.
Financial Reporting
The quality of financial reporting lay at the heart of the Cadbury Report. While company law holds boards responsible for the financial reporting process, the extent to which boards effectively discharged these responsibilities in the pre-Cadbury period was questionable (Cadbury Report, 1992) . As an indication of the relatively low weight that many boards attached to financial reporting matters, only 38% of companies surveyed by the Bank of England in 1988 had established an audit committee (Bank of England, 1988) . In contrast, this figure had risen to almost 92% by 1995, the majority of which had written terms of reference outlining their membership, authority and duties (Cadbury Compliance Report, 1995) .
A central issue affecting the quality of financial statements is the extent to which managers manipulate reported earnings numbers (Cadbury Report, 1992, pp.14) . The board's legal responsibility for the content and presentation of financial statements raises the expectation that effective boards will attempt to constrain 8 opportunistic earnings management activity. Peasnell et al. (1999) , Beasley (1996) and Dechow et al. (1996) present evidence that income-increasing earnings management activity is negatively related to the proportion of non-executive board members.
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However, these studies do not examine how this association has evolved over time.
All else equal, if the Cadbury Report (1992) and the ensuing governance debate have helped improve the effectiveness with which boards discharge their financial reporting responsibilities, one might expect the association between board composition and income-increasing earnings management to have become more pronounced in the post-Cadbury period. We therefore test the following hypothesis:
H1: Ceteris paribus, the negative association between income-increasing earnings management and the proportion of non-executive board members is more pronounced in the post-Cadbury period.
METHODOLOGY
Earnings Management
A series of earnings management instruments are potentially available to managers. These range from real operating decisions such as asset sales (Black et al., 1998; Bartov, 1993) and changes in R&D expenditure (Bushee, 1998; Bange and DeBondt, 1998) , to pure financial reporting decisions such as accounting method changes (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986) and accrual choices (McNichols and Wilson, 1988) . We proxy for earnings management using accounting accruals in the expectation that accruals are likely to represent a favored instrument for manipulating reporting income because of their relative low cost and opaque nature. Accrual-based measures are also theoretically appealing because they aggregate into a single measure the net effect of numerous recognition and measurement decisions, thereby capturing the portfolio nature of income determination (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990, pp.138) .
We use the modified-Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995) to generate estimates of accrual management. However, evidence suggests this model identifies discretionary accruals imprecisely due to the confounding effects of factors unrelated to earnings management in the period (Guay et al. 1996; Healy 1996; Dechow et al. 1995 (Young, 1999, pp.11; Beneish, 1998, pp.5) . Specifically, the modified-Jones model parameters are estimated using the following cross-sectional OLS regression:
where WC i is working capital accruals for firm i, defined as the change in non-cash current assets minus the change in current liabilities, ∆REV i is the change in revenue, ω 0 and ω 1 are regression coefficients, and ν i is the regression residual. The model is estimated separately for each industry and year combination. All variables are scaled by lagged total assets to reduce heteroskedasticity. Industry-year portfolios with less than ten observations are excluded from the analysis to allow more efficient estimation of the regression parameters.
Following Dechow et al. (1995) , abnormal accruals (AA) for the modifiedJones model are defined as follows:
where 0 ω and 1 ω are the OLS regression estimates of ω 0 and ω 1 obtained from equation (1) and ∆REC i is the change in receivables.
Research Design
In view of the potential ambiguity in estimated abnormal accruals, we test for the association between earnings management and board effectiveness by focusing on a situation in which the incentive for income-increasing earnings management is expected to be particularly strong. We begin by defining unmanaged earnings (UME)
as reported earnings (EARN t ) minus abnormal accruals (AA t ). Following Degeorge et al. (1998) and Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) , we expect the incentives for incomeincreasing earnings management to be particularly strong when UME falls below target earnings. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) examine two earnings targets.
Specifically, they suggest that managers will seek to avoid reporting losses (EARN t < 0) and earnings declines (EARN t < EARN t-1 ). This leads to the prediction that incomeincreasing accruals will be more likely when UME < 0 and when UME < EARN t-1 .
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To test the whether the constraining effect of NEDs on earnings management activity is more pronounced in the post-Cadbury period, we estimate the following OLS regression model: We partition sample observations according to whether UME is above or below the targets specified above and estimate equation (3) separately for each subset.
If earnings management is taking place and our predictions about the role of boards are correct, then we would expect the estimated coefficient on OUT to be negative and significant. Moreover, if hypothesis one is correct and outside directors are more effective in the post-Cadbury period, then the estimated coefficient on OUT for the post-Cadbury regime (λ 1 ) should be more negative than that for the pre-Cadbury regime (λ 1 + γ 1 ) when UME is below-target. In other words, we expect λ 1 to be negative and significant and γ 1 to be positive and significant when regression (3) is estimated for the below-target sub-samples. Conversely, we have no predictions for the coefficients on OUT and OUT·CAD when regression (3) is estimated for the subsamples where UME is above-target, since systematic income-increasing accrual management is not predicted to occur in these circumstances.
Prior research suggests that accrual management may be related to the level of insider ownership (Warfield et al. 1995) , external ownership structure (Rajgopal and Venkatachalam, 1998) , auditor quality (Becker et al. 1998) , the probability of debt covenant violation (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994) , political costs (Han and Wang, 1998), smoothing (DeFond and Park, 1997), and operating cash flow performance (Dechow et al. 1995) . We therefore include proxies for these potential determinants of abnormal accruals as additional control variables in regression (3). We also control for board size in our empirical tests given (a) the well-documented positive association between board size and the proportion of NEDs and (b) the suggestion that board effectiveness may be negatively related to board size (Yermack, 1996) . Variable definitions, together with their expected relation with AA, are presented in table 1.
Consistent with our predictions for board composition, the predicted signs for the ownership structure, auditor quality and board size variables relate only to those instances where incentive for earnings management is high (i.e., when UME < target).
The predictions for the remaining variables apply to both above-and below-target samples.
Sample and Data
The relation between board composition and abnormal accruals is examined using a sample of U.K.-incorporated quoted companies for a period spanning the publication of the Cadbury Report (1992). We begin by defining two sub-periods that The modified-Jones model is estimated for each industry and year combination using all firms on the Datastream Active and Research files with available accruals data. 12 The number of firms used to estimate the model in 1990 (1991, 1994 and 1995 398 (1990), 413 (1991), 456 (1994) and 416 (1995) . The pre-Cadbury period therefore consists of 811 firm-year observations, while the post-Cadbury period consists of 872 firm-year observations.
PRELIMINARY RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
Over the 126 industry-year combinations for which the modified-Jones model is estimated, the mean (median) R-squared statistic is 18% (11%). The mean value of the coefficient on ∆REV (ω 1 ) in the modified-Jones model is 0.015 which is insignificantly different from zero (p = 0.170). In the pre-Cadbury sample, 142 firms (18%) are classified as below target when UME is benchmarked against zero, while 439 firms (54%) are classified as below target when UME is benchmarked against Our empirical tests of the link between board effectiveness and earnings management are based on a prediction of income-increasing accruals when UME falls short of target earnings. Table 3 reports mean and median abnormal accruals for the above-and below-target sub-samples and provides evidence consistent with this prediction. Panel A presents results for UME benchmarked against zero while panel B
reports findings for UME benchmarked against EARN t-1 . Reported earnings are defined as earnings before extraordinary items (Datastream item #182) less preference dividends. 15 Mean and median abnormal accruals in the below target sub-samples (UME < 0 and UME < EARN t-1 ) are positive and significant in panels A and B for both the pre-and post-Cadbury samples. These findings support the prediction that working capital accruals are being managed upwards in both periods as a means of achieving target earnings. In contrast, average abnormal accruals in the above target samples (UME ≥ 0 and UME ≥ EARN t-1 ) are negative, indicating no systematic propensity for income-increasing accounting choices in either period when UME exceeds target earnings.
The earnings management predictions are ambiguous for those firms where UME undershoots target earnings by a large amount. On the one hand, management concerns over costly sanctions in the form of additional monitoring (DeAngelo et al. 1994 ) and the increased likelihood of dismissal (Weisbach 1988 ) suggest a preference for income-increasing choices. On the other hand, the big bath hypothesis predicts income-decreasing abnormal accruals as managers seek to store up positive earnings for future periods (Degeorge et al 1998, pp.14; Healy 1985, pp.90-91) . Big bath earnings management would potentially confound our empirical tests of hypothesis one because it is based on a prediction of income-increasing abnormal accruals when UME is below target. To assess whether income-increasing earnings management is apparent across the full range of UME in the below target subsets, table 3 also reports mean and median abnormal accruals partitioned by the extent to which UME (standardized lagged total assets) undershoots target earnings. 16 The partition labeled "Small" contains firm-years where UME just misses the target, while that labeled "Large" contains firm-years where the shortfall is greatest. All else equal, the big bath hypothesis predicts negative abnormal accruals in "Large". In contrast, estimated abnormal accruals in the "Large" partition are positive and significant at the 0.01 for both the pre-and post-Cadbury periods. Abnormal accruals are also positive and significant in the remaining four partitions. These results hold regardless of whether we define the earnings target as zero (panel A) or last period's reported earnings (panel B). The findings suggest that pooling the observations in the below-target subsamples is justified since they appear to be relatively homogenous with respect to the direction of abnormal accrual activity.
Regression Results
Tests of whether the negative association between income-increasing earnings While we offer no formal explanation for the temporal shifts in relation to AUD, BRDOWN and BLOCK, the significant governance changes occurring during the period are such that it is perhaps not surprising that we also observe structural breaks for these mechanisms. Of the remaining control variables only the operating cash flow variable is significant at conventional levels.
Consistent with the lack of any systematic attempts to artificially boost reported earnings when UME exceed target earnings, results in panel A provide no evidence of a link between abnormal accruals and board composition in either subperiod for the above-target sub-sample (columns 6-8). Similarly, there is little evidence that any of the additional governance variables are systematically associated with earnings management activity when UME exceed target earnings. The estimated coefficients on SIZE, REL and CFO display their predicted signs and are significant at conventional levels. The coefficient on LEV is also marginally significant, although it has the opposite sign to that predicted. evidence of a significant negative association between AA and OUT is apparent in either the pre-or post-Cadbury periods when regression (3) is estimated using the above target sub-sample (columns 6-8).
To summarise, the findings presented in table 4 are consistent with the hypothesis that boards, and NEDs in particular, are discharging their financial reporting responsibilities more effectively in the post-Cadbury period. 18 Moreover, the lack of any significant association between abnormal accruals and board composition in the pre-Cadbury period is consistent with the unfettered use of creative accounting practices that motivated the formation of the Cadbury Committee in the first place.
However, while these findings are consistent our primary hypothesis, our tests do not directly demonstrate that the observed structural break in the relation between abnormal accruals and board composition is a consequence of the changes brought about by the Cadbury Report and the associated governance debate. In the next section, therefore, we extend our analysis to consider two alternative explanations that may be driving our results.
ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS
The FRS3 Hypothesis
Pope and Walker (1998) and Beattie et al. (1994) provide evidence that prior to the introduction of FRS3, U.K. companies used the flexibility inherent in the classification of extraordinary items to manage reported earnings. The introduction of FRS3 in July 1993 effectively outlawed the use of extraordinary items for financial reporting purposes and in so doing eliminated a potentially important earnings management tool. In the context of the present study, FRS3 limits the use of extraordinary items to our pre-Cadbury sub-period only. Recall that our basic results focus on earnings before extraordinary items (Datastream item 182). If, prior to FRS3, firms were using extraordinary items to manipulate reported earnings, then proxying for earnings management using accrual-based measures will generate lower power tests in the pre-Cadbury period, relative to the post-Cadbury period. This raises the possibility that our inability to document an association between earnings management and board composition in the pre-Cadbury period may be due to our failure to use the appropriate earnings management instrument, rather than because of any improvement in board monitoring resulting from the Cadbury Report. UMEXI < 0 reported a negative XI, compared with only 35% of firms with UMEXI ≥ 0 (difference is significant at the 0.01 level). The mean (median) XI is -4% (-3%) of total assets for firms where UMEXI < 0, compared with zero for firms with UMEXI ≥ 0. These differences are significant at the 0.01 level. Similarly, when UMEXI is benchmarked against EARN t-1 (panel B), 55% of the below-target group reported an income-increasing XI, compared with only 18% of above-target firms (difference significant at 0.01 level). These results therefore provide clear evidence that firms in our pre-Cadbury sample were using extraordinary items to manage reported earnings upwards when unmanaged earnings fell below target earnings.
Having established that XIs appear to have been used by companies in the preCadbury period to manipulate reported earnings, we test whether NEDs constrained the use of XIs among below-target firms in the same way that they appear to constrain abnormal accruals post-Cadbury. Table 6 
Temporal Variation in the Stimulus for Earnings Management
While managers may face strong incentives to exercise their financial reporting discretion in all accounting periods, the underlying rationale may vary across time. We conjecture that the dominant stimulus for accrual management will depend on the specific circumstances facing the firm which will be governed, at least in part, by the general economic climate. Temporal shifts in general economic performance, therefore, are expected to lead to variation in the stimulus for earnings management.
The sample period examined in this study spans two contrasting periods of general economic performance: the pre-Cadbury window (1990) (1991) is associated with a recessionary period, while the post-Cadbury period (1994) (1995) is associated with higher growth and improved economic performance. Therefore, if differences in underlying economic performance affect either the propensity or stimulus for earnings management (or both), our failure to observe a systematic association between abnormal accruals and board composition in the pre-Cadbury period may simply reflect a failure to consider the appropriate earnings management stimulus. More specifically, the desire to manage earnings upwards to meet pre-determined earnings targets in the pre-Cadbury period may have been dominated by other concerns.
Prior research provides evidence that managers select income-increasing accounting methods as a means of avoiding costly debt covenant violation (e.g., DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994) . From table 3 we note that leverage is significantly higher in the pre-Cadbury period. To the extent that leverage proxies for the likelihood of debt contract violation (Press and Weintrop, 1990) , it is possible that earnings management activity in the pre-Cadbury period was directed more towards avoiding or delaying technical breaches of accounting-based debt contracts, rather than at attaining specific earnings targets. If this was indeed the case, then the constraining effect of NEDs is more likely to have been evident for high leverage firms, rather than for firms with UME less than target earnings.
21
We test this prediction by assigning pre-Cadbury firm-year observations to quintile portfolios formed on the basis of leverage. Using these quintile portfolios, we construct a "high leverage" partition consisting of all firm-years in the top two quintiles of the leverage distribution. If NEDs constrain accrual-based earnings management activity aimed at deferring or avoiding the costs of debt contract violations, then we would expect to observe a negative association between AA and OUT when regression (3) is estimated using the high leverage partition. For comparative purposes, we also estimate regression (3) for a "low leverage" partition consisting of all firm-years in the bottom two quintiles of the leverage distribution.
Since we do not expect these firms to systematically manage earnings upwards, no association between AA and OUT is predicted for this partition. Results are presented in table 7. While the estimated coefficient on OUT in the high leverage partition is negative as predicted, it is not significant at conventional levels. As such, these results provide no evidence to support the view that changes in the stimulus for earnings management over our sample period are responsible for the structural break in the association between abnormal accruals and board composition reported in section 4.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper examines the association between the composition of the board of directors and accrual management activity in two contrasting governance regimes in the U.K.. Prior to the publication of the Cadbury Report in December 1992, U.K.
boards were consider by many to be relative passive entities, often dominated by the very managers they were supposed to monitor. This led to general concerns about a lack of managerial accountability, together with specific concerns that boards were failing to effectively discharge their financial reporting responsibilities. In response, the Cadbury Report made a series of recommendations relating to board structure.
Central to these proposals is the view that effective board monitoring is enhanced by the use of outside (non-executive) directors. Subsequent efforts by U.K. firms to comply with the Cadbury recommendations on board structure have increased both the profile of, and demand for, non-executive directors. This paper tests whether the increased emphasis on board monitoring and non-executive directors is associated with improved managerial accountability, as reflected by a reduction in the level of accrual management activity.
We evaluate the impact of the Cadbury Report by testing for evidence of income-increasing abnormal accruals when unmanaged earnings undershoot target earnings and whether outside directors help constrain such activity. Our results provide evidence of accrual management to meet earnings targets in both the pre-and post-Cadbury periods. Perhaps unsurprisingly, these results suggest that the recent changes in the U.K. governance system have failed to eliminate all earnings management activity. Regarding the specific association between earnings management and board composition, we find no evidence of an association between the degree of accrual management and the fraction of non-executive directors in the pre-Cadbury period. This is consistent with the unfettered use of creative accounting practices that led to the establishment of Cadbury Committee in the first place. In contrast, results for the post-Cadbury period indicate less income-increasing accrual management to avoid earnings losses or earnings declines when the proportion of nonexecutive directors is high. These results are consistent with the view that End Notes 1 The Cadbury Report also highlighted the importance of the statutory audit as a control mechanism in the financial reporting process. 2 Managing accounting accruals within the constraints of GAAP represents a less extreme form of manipulation than either GAAP violations or outright fraud. From a monitoring perspective, this increased subtlety may also limit the ability of NEDs to detect and control earnings management activity. 3 A similar move towards board empowerment has been documented in the U.S. by Millstein and MacAvoy (1998) and Lorsch (1995) . 4 See for example, "Cadbury successor may change board reforms" (Financial Times, 1995) , "The old boy network is put out to grass" (Times, 1994) , and the report by the Institutional Shareholders Committee (1991) on the role and duties of directors. 5 For example, "Listed directors against increased Cadbury Code requirements" (The Independent, 1996) , "Call to replace Cadbury and Greenbury Codes" (The Independent, 1996), "Chewing over Cadbury" (Times, 1994) , and 'New image: old message' (Times, 1994) . 6 These studies assume that in the absence of a reliable means of distinguishing between the competing incentives for earnings management (i.e., opportunism, efficient contracting, or signalling), NEDs attempt to constrain the subset of accounting choices that most likely reflect managerial opportunism. Prior research generally associates opportunistic behavior by managers with income-increasing accounting choices (Holthausen 1990; Watts and Zimmerman 1986) . Consequently, these studies test for a negative association between income-increasing earnings management and the presence of NEDs. 7 Confounding factors include exogenous shocks to firm performance, strategic operating decisions, and the reversal of prior-period discretionary accruals. 8 The procedure has the additional advantage over the time-series approach that it does not require the assumption that parameter estimates remain stable over time. 9 In the original specification of the modified-Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995) , adjusting the ∆REV term for the change in receivables (∆REC) is done after equation
(1) has been fitted. In other words, for estimation purposes the Jones and modifiedJones models are equivalent. Recently, however, researchers have begun to estimate cross-sectional versions of the modified-Jones model in which ∆REV is adjusted by ∆REC at the estimation stage (e.g., Rajgopal and Venkatachalam, 1998) . We repeated our empirical tests using this alternative specification of the modified-Jones model. In all cases, the findings were consistent with those based on equation (1). 10 However, below-target UME may not necessarily lead managers to prefer incomeincreasing earnings management. In particular, it may be either infeasible or prohibitively costly to manage earnings upwards to meet the target when UME falls far short. In these circumstances, managers may even prefer to adopt a "big bath" strategy and make income-decreasing accruals, effectively storing up incomeincreasing earnings management options for future periods (Degeorge et al. 1998, pp.14; Healy 1985, pp.90-91) . Whether this actually happens is an empirical issue that we address in section 4. 11 We exclude the period June 1992 to December 1992 from the pre-Cadbury period in an effort to reduce contamination of our results by firms that changed their board structure in response to the Cadbury Committee's draft report published in May 1992.
We exclude the period December 1992 to May 1994 from the post-Cadbury period because this represented a transition period during which time companies were responding to the recommendations contained in the Committee's final report and their subsequent adoption by the London Stock Exchange in June 1993. 12 The sample of firm-years used to test hypothesis one is a subset of the firm-year observations used to estimate regression (1). 13 The Corporate Register is published quarterly by Hemmington Scott Ltd. and includes data for all firms listed on the London Stock Exchange. Hemmington Scott up-date their board composition database using information from the London Stock Exchange and Reuters. The publication lag for the register is approximately one month. We use the September edition of the Corporate Register in calendar year t to identify board composition for firms with year-ends between March of year t and February of year t+1. 14 Sample firms are fairly evenly distributed across industry groups. The largest industry represented in the sample is general engineering with 157 firm-year observations (9.3%). None of the remaining industries account for more than 6% of the final sample. extraordinary items. 16 Virtually identical results are obtained using unscaled UME, as well as UME scaled by the absolute magnitude of working capital accrual balances. 17 The coefficient for AUD in the pre-Cadbury period is -0.04 (i.e., 0.015 -0.055), which is significant at the 0.05 level using a one-tailed test. 18 These tests use pooled cross-sectional time-series data in which the sample firms are heterogeneous from year to year. This incomplete panel design raises the possibility that the structural break in the association between abnormal accruals and board composition could be attributable to a correlated omitted variables problem resulting from differences in the composition of the pre-and post-Cadbury samples. To address this concern, we re-ran all regressions using a restricted sample comprising only those firms with observations in both the pre-and post-Cadbury sub-periods. This approach allows each firm to act as its own control, thereby reducing the potential problems associated with a comparison of heterogeneous samples. Of our initial sample, 360 firms were represented in both periods, yielding a pooled dataset of 1260 firm-year observations. Results for regression (3) based on this reduced sample were similar to those reported in table 4 for the full sample. 19 Consistent with our prior tests, we have no predictions regarding the association between XI and OUT when the regression is estimated for the above target samples, since systematic income-increasing accrual management is not predicted to occur in these circumstances. 20 In addition to the OLS regressions, we also estimated binary and multinomial logit models relating the probability of a firm reporting an extraordinary item to the proportion of NEDs. Without exception, the estimated coefficient on OUT never attained significance at the 10% level or better. 21 Note, however, that earnings management to avoid technical violation of bond covenants could be in the interests of shareholders because it may reduce the overall costs to the firm. As such, it is not necessarily the case that the board will automatically seek to constrain this form of earnings management. 
